So we know what the good and the bad are of military contractors. In my opinion the good and the bad almost cancel each other out. The good can greatly benefit the military in many ways whereas the bad can seriously cripple the military.
Now, I seek to understand the strategic impact contractors have on within the military and any recommendations that could be helpful.
STRATEGIC IMPACT
Dr. T.X. Hammes argues that contractors are not evaluated on the strategic impact they may or may not have upon the counterinsurgency operations like we have been in Iraq and Afghanistan. While contractors do get reviewed by the Defense Department, but simply not evaluated over strategic impact. Contractors ultimately make it easier for a military/country to go to war. Think about it... instead of mobilizing a force of 300,000 soldiers, cut out to preform all the tasks that the contractors usually perform, you may only mobilize 150,000 men and the rest (150,000) would be civilian contractors. As a military general or politician, you are only responsible for mobilizing 150,000 soldiers, not the contractors. This could make entering a conflict much easier and less burdensome militarily and publicly (the public only hears, and cares about the men and women in uniform). A country using contractors are much more capable and flexible. For example, the US was involved in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. We could not preform that task without the help of contractors. Contractors involved in combat zone are especially at risk of negatively impacting the United State's legitimacy. Field Manual 3–24, Counterinsurgency, states that the conflict is a competition for legitimacy between the counterinsurgent and the insurgent. If the contractor in some way hinders the military's legitimacy with the host nation and or a particular insurgent, the impact could be massive.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Hammes says, "The U.S. Government's default position should be no contractors "outside the wire" in a conflict zone. Contractor presence outside secure facilities places them in direct contact with the population. Contractors can undercut the legitimacy of the host nation government, reduce the accountability of the U.S. Government for actions taken in its name, irritate the population, compete directly for the most competent local personnel, fragment the chain of command, provide an excuse for forming local militias, and are difficult to fire—even when ineffective. Given these issues, the United States should strive to keep contractors out of conflict zones. This will not always be possible but should be the standard. Most of the problems highlighted in this article occurred in conflict zones. The unique stresses on the contractors combined with the severe limitations on the government's ability to oversee their performance resulted in repeated actions that reduced operational effectiveness and undercut the U.S. strategic position. The cost savings of using contractors are uncertain at best. In contrast, the strategic and operational problems that arise from using them in a counterinsurgency are clear and documented. If U.S. Government capacity is exceeded, the default position should become using host nation organizations first and host nation contractors next with U.S. or foreign contractors being a choice of last resort.Examples where local contractors should be first choice are inside secure facilities and as fixed point security. Many of the jobs contractors perform inside facilities—meal preparation, cleaning—can easily be done by local labor...Hiring local laborers provides economic stimulus.In addition, the fixed point security mission may well be appropriate for local personnel because these jobs require little training and, because they are in a fixed position, are easier to supervise.If contractors are required, they must be under the direct supervision of a U.S. Government employee. While the government is making strenuous efforts to increase the number of contracting officers and to become more specific in writing contracts, the fact remains that the government cannot control contractor actions without direct supervision. Unless it has direct supervision, the government will remain unaware of contractors whose actions alienate the local population or fail to meet U.S. standards. The degree of supervision will vary with the type of work being done. Routine maintenance work in a secure facility would require only normal contracting oversight. Armed escorts or drivers who are in regular contact with civilian populations would require constant supervision in the form of a government employee riding with each vehicle and commanding each convoy. Armed contractors are having a global impact well beyond that of the two irregular wars America is fighting. Armed contractors introduce a new element into international relations. Current international law and international organizations such as the United Nations have developed protocols and procedures for dealing with the use of the armed forces of nation-states as well as insurgents. However, these same organizations have a paucity of experience in dealing with the introduction of armed contractors into a conflict zone whether those contractors are hired by a private firm or a nation-state. This leads to a final recommendation.
The United States must develop policies and procedures to deal with the presence of armed contractors in conflict zones. Because these armed entities are generally outside the experience and mandate of current international organizations and mechanisms, they will continue to have unforeseen impacts. Thus, the United States must work with other states, NGOs, and international organizations to develop policies, procedures, and institutions to deal with the presence of armed contractors in conflict zones".
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