Research Note
Since the World Wars and the Cold
War warfare has shifted dramatically. So drastically American has experienced
the worst attack on her homeland; the 9/11 attacks. Since the 9/11 attacks,
America and the World have seen the rise of a new and effective warfare that
has been unstoppable to conventional forces. As we have seen in Vietnam, Iraq,
and now Afghanistan. You can call this new warfare terrorist, non-state actors,
guerrilla fighters or some other name that would fit the description, but they
are almost indefinable.
The United States of America has
been a major player in the war all over the world and for the last sixty years
have lead the world in military advancement. Since we fought for our
independence America has not seen defeat except in our enemy up until the
Vietnam War and now the war against the Taliban in Afghanistan. One can argue
America did not lose in Vietnam or America is not losing in Afghanistan
currently, it really doesn’t matter. What does matter is America saw a shift in
the result of these two wars; it was no clear victory for America like it has
been in the past.
Strategy, tactics, moral,
technology, and manpower are all important and necessary to fight a war,
however, arguably, I feel America doesn’t understand or know how to deal with
our enemies particularly unconventional forces such as the Vietcong, Taliban,
or typical tribal and insurgency groups. How do you put your finger on a group
that denies the laws of war? How do you conduct diplomacy with a group that has
no official diplomats? How do you negotiate with terrorist groups that ignore
borders and believe that your country should no longer exist? America failure
to develop strategies and techniques to handle these complex insurgent groups,
terrorist organizations, and militant tribal groups such as the Taliban proves
to be the problem. David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgent expert, lays it down
perfectly, “ that while many classical counterinsurgency techniques apply to
modern conflicts, in overall terms we face a transfigured form of hybrid
warfare that renders many of our traditional ideas irrelevant” (xvii).
David Kilcullen, a native
Australian and former advisor to General David Patraeus in Iraq and to the NATO
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, currently serves as a consultant to
the U.S. Government. He wrote a book called The
Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in The Midst of a Big One. In
this book Kilcullen “uncovers the face of modern warfare, illuminating both the
global challenge (the “War on Terrorism”) and small wars across the World”
(back of book). And he has some answers
to our questions above. Kilcullen recommends we change our paradigm and our
policy to help the problem. The number one shift that should take place
according to Kilcullen is a vocabulary change. He mentions, “professor Michael
Vlahos has pointed out that the language we use to describe the new treats
actively hinders innovative thought” (295) For example, our terminology for
these groups or organization are negative in nature. Unconventional, nonstate,
irregular forces all describe the
enemy but give them a description of what they are not rather than what they
actually are. Instead of approaching diplomacy with these organizations in an
international relations mindset and terminology, Kilcullen recommends we us an
anthropology approach, which we would understand their culture, social
relationships, and institution within their society. A diplomat educated in a
particular culture and language would greatly benefit the relationship between
the two actors (Kilcullen, 296).
Secondly, Kilcullen recommends
using an element of soft power. He mentions that the majority of our spending
goes to the Military whereas we should be investing in nonmilitary “elements of
national power”, such as “private sector economic strength, national
reputation, and cultural confidence”. Our military can only achieve so much and
often faces obstacles that military bureaucracy cannot overcome. There is an imbalance of our military and
nonmilitary abilities, therefore hindering America to achieve whatever she sets
out to do. Think about it, America’s “Defense Department is about 210 time
larger than the U.S Agency for international Development and State Department
combined” (Kilcullen, 298). Now put yourself in the shoes of an enemy of the
United States, do you get the feeling that America wants to collaborate and fix
the problem or just use force unilaterally to overcome the problem?
Kilcullen, as an outsider
(Australian) sees the problem from the outside and make great sense of the
tangled mess. As one planning to go into the military, it is hard to overcome
my own opinions and realize our military is not the solution to every problem
on the international scale. Kilcullen says he does not discredit the military
and its capabilities, he being an officer in the Australian military himself,
but he warns that the imbalance could be harmful and give the wrong impression.
Kilcullen is an source for information dealing with the future of warfare and transforming
our military and non military into a
capable force to confront our enemies.
